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The relationship between religious faith and public reason has occupied an in-
creasingly central role in  Jürgen Habermas’s mature work. Yet this recent 
engagement with questions of  religious meaning also illuminates a  signifi-
cant area of development in Habermas’s thought. While his earlier writings 
emphasized a  need to  subordinate religious beliefs to  rational critique and 
to translate religious truth claims into publicly accessible forms of reasoning, 
his later writings signal a shift to a more cooperative understanding of  reli-
gious faith and critical reason that highlights the ongoing potential of religion 
to advance rational discourse and social criticism in the public sphere. This 
essay traces this growing recognition of  the irreducibility of religious mean-
ing in Habermas’s writings, and it attends to the non-translatable dimension 
of religious faith as a source of its ongoing contemporary significance.
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Nothing of theological content will persist without being trans-
formed; every content will have to put itself to the test of migrating 
into the realm of the secular, the profane.
Adorno, Reason and Revelation1
To articulate the past does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really 
was’ (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at 
a moment of danger.
Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History2
The critique of  religious meaning, and the relationship between reli-
gious faith and public reasoning, has emerged as a central and organiz-
ing focus of Jürgen Habermas’s recent work. With an output spanning 
more than five decades, Habermas’s writings on  positivism, philoso-
phies of  consciousness and language, and communicative rationality 
offer a host of direct and indirect insights into the potential of religious 
ideas and forms of  learning as  a  source of  moral and philosophical 
insight.3 Yet in the course of his work, Habermas’s position on the rela-
tionship of religious faith to critical reason has also undergone notable 
revision. Where his early work indicated a clear need to subordinate 
religious truth claims to reasoned public critique, his more recent writ-
ings highlight the ongoing potential of religious faith to meaningfully 
inform contemporary democratic discourse, a potential which he notes 
has grown particularly acute in  the face of  contemporary political 
crises and the threat of nationalistic violence. Moreover, in  this later 
stage of his work, Habermas has also engaged in a number of critical 
1 T. Adorno, Reason and Revelation, in: E. Mendieta (ed.), The Frankfurt School 
on Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers, New York 2005, p. 167. 
2 W.  Benjamin, Theses on  the Philosophy of  History, in: E.  Mendieta (ed.), The 
Frankfurt School on Religion, p. 267.
3 See, for example, his early essay Dialectical Idealism in  Transition to  Materi-
alism: The Philosophical Historical Consequences of Schelling’s Idea about the Contraction 
of God, in: J. Habermas, Theorie und Praxis, Neuwied 1963; and Habermas’s exploration 
of the interconnections of religion, social solidarity, and moral authority in The Author-
ity of the Sacred and the Normative Background of Communicative Action, in: J. Habermas, 
Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason, trans. T. McCarthy, Boston 1987, p. 43–76. 
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dialogues with prominent religious figures and scholars of  theology 
and religion, and his writings have indicated both a more cautious ap-
proach to overtly religious themes and a renewed willingness to attend 
to the intellectual and social claims of religious traditions.4
This trend in Habermas’s writings signals an important shift in em-
phasis in his treatment of religion. His early work held to the secular-
ization thesis prominent in discussions of social sciences in the 1970s 
and 1980s, which maintained that the relevance of religion would in-
evitably wane and pass away, and any rational content worth preserving 
would increasingly migrate into the sphere of philosophy or the social 
sciences.5 His later writings, by contrast, reveal an ongoing reevaluation 
of religious ideas and practices, and of the potential for religious tradi-
tions to  speak to pressing social challenges and political deficiencies 
in the contemporary age. This developing position on religion and pub-
lic reason, and its apparent departure from the trajectory of his earlier 
critique, has sparked a renewed interest in Habermas’s writings of reli-
gion. Some critics point to a “religious turn” in Habermas’s later work.6 
Similarly, his seemingly newfound openness to  religion has spurred 
on a variety of studies exploring possible intersections of this new di-
mension of Habermas’s work with contemporary discussions in philos-
ophy of religion and practical theology.7 Other scholars, however, point 
4 See, for instance, Habermas’s high profile exchange with Joseph Ratzinger, later 
to become pope Benedict XVI, in Habermas, Ein Bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt, Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 10.02.2007; and J. Habermas, J. Ratzinger, Dialectics of Secularization: 
On Reason and Religion, San Francisco 2006. For a critical analysis of this exchange, see 
F. G. Lawrence, Transcendence from Within: Benedict XVI and Jürgen Habermas on the 
Dialogue between Secular Reason and Religious Faith, in: F. G. Lawrence, The Fragility 
of Consciousness: Faith, Reason, and the Human Good, R. S. Rosenberg, K. M. Vander 
Schel (eds.), Toronto 2017, p. 193–228. For a broader conversation between Habermas 
and scholars of religion and theology, see C. Calhoun, E. Mendieta, J. VanAntwerpen 
(eds.), Habermas and Religion, Malden 2013. 
5 See J.  Habermas, Reply to  My Critics, in: C.  Calhoun, E.  Mendieta, J.  Van- 
Antwerpen (eds.), Habermas and Religion, p. 348–349; and J. Habermas, Notes on a Post-
Secular Society, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, April 2008.
6 See M. Dillon, Jürgen Habermas and the Post-Secular Appropriation of Religion: 
A Sociological Critique, in: P. Gorski et al., (eds.), The Post-Secular in Question: Religion 
in Contemporary Society, New York 2012, p. 250.
7 For a helpful overview of theologians’ engagement with Habermas’s thought, 
see N. Adams, Habermas and Theology, New York 2006, p. 182–202; see also M. Junker- 
-Kenny’s book by the same title, Habermas and Theology, New York 2011. 
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to  these recent shifts in  Habermas’s writings as  illustrating a  more 
gradual move from a general and at times one-sided treatment of reli-
gion to a more nuanced and open-ended analysis of the place of reli-
gion in the public sphere.8
This essay attends to this ongoing development of Habermas’s cri-
tique of religion, particularly with regard to his recurring discussions 
of the “translatability” of religious meaning into secular or public dis-
course. While his early works pointed to the supercession of religious 
belief by public and generally accessible forms of reasoning, his later 
writings signal a pair of important shifts: first to the possibility of an 
abstemious co-existence of  religious faith and critical reason; and fi-
nally to a genuine cooperation of religion and reason in advancing ra-
tional discourse and social criticism in  the public sphere. These later 
writings continue to maintain the position that the rational insights 
and “semantic potential” of religion should be expressed as far as pos-
sible in the generally accessible categories of public reason. Yet Haber-
mas also comes to recognize a limit to this capacity of public reason 
to capture and repurpose the insights of religious faith and locates the 
ongoing significance of  religious traditions in  their non-translatable 
character and their distinction from other philosophical and political 
forms of reasoning.
This evolving perspective reflects both Habermas’s ongoing ties 
to the provocative social criticism of the early Frankfurt School and his 
own innovative theory of communicative action. Setting aside the pre-
sumption of progressive secularization as unable to adequately account 
for the complex trajectories and conflicts of modernity, his writings call 
for new frameworks for critical reflection on religious belief and a sig-
nificant re-evaluation of  the potential of  religious faith and practice 
to inform responsible public discourse. In tracing the lines of Haber-
mas’s developing perspective on the role of religion in the public sphere, 
then, it  will be  helpful to  first attend to  the important background 
of his critique of religion in the early writings of the Frankfurt School.
8 Eduardo Mendieta, for instance, argues Habermas’s treatment of the relation-
ship between religious meaning and philosophical or rational discourse is best exam-
ined in its development: “it would be unrealistic and absurd to approach Habermas’s 
work without attending to its transformation over the past five decades.” See E. Men- 
dieta, Appendix: Religion in Habermas’s Work, in: C. Calhoun, E. Mendieta, J. VanAn-
twerpen (eds.), Habermas and Religion, p. 392; on this point, see also M. Junker-Kenny, 
Habermas and Theology.
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Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
on Religion
Behind Habermas’s own treatments of  religion lies a  series of  pro-
vocative studies emerging from the writings of thinkers such as Ernst 
Bloch, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
W. Adorno, and Walter Benjamin. Against the backdrop of economic 
uncertainty of the interwar period, the dissolution of Weimar Republic, 
and rise of National Socialism, this eclectic group of thinkers carried 
out an ambitious and innovative program of interdisciplinary research 
and social criticism. The work of  this “Frankfurt School,” as  it came 
to be called in the 1960s, centered in the Institute for Social Research 
(Institut für Sozialforschung) founded in 1923 at the University of Frank-
furt am Main.9 The wide-ranging research trajectories of  these early 
thinkers are difficult to summarize, yet together they engaged in ambi-
tious and pioneering studies that would exercise a significant influence 
on  subsequent critical studies in  the humanities, spurring on  the de-
velopment of disciplines and forms of inquiry such as cultural studies, 
media studies, and philosophy of technology, and providing an impe-
tus as  well to  a  number of  currents of  poststructuralist and postmo- 
dern philosophy.10 Scholars at the Institute, under the initial leadership 
  9 For a comprehensive overview of the development of the Frankfurt school and 
its principal figures, see Rolf Wiggerhaus’s important volume, The Frankfurt School: 
Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, Cambridge 1986. Wiggerhaus notes that 
despite the common usage of the terms “Frankfurt School” and “Critical Theory” to-
day, there was persistent disagreement among members of this institute regarding the 
meaning of both terms (see p. 1–8). In particular, Horkheimer and Adorno, often iden-
tified as the central figures of the Frankfurt School, reflected notably different research 
trajectories. 
10 Michel Foucault comments: “If I  had known about the Frankfurt School 
in time, I would have been saved a great deal of work. I would not have said a certain 
amount of nonsense and would not have taken so many false trails trying not to get 
lost, when the Frankfurt School had already cleared the way.” Quoted in  R. Wig-
gerhaus, The Frankfurt School, p. 4. The name “Critical Theory,” taken from a 1937 essay 
by Horkheimer on “Traditional and Critical Theory” indicated a diverse set of research 
strategies converging on social analysis, a critique of post-Enlightenment rationality, 
and the historical materialism inspired especially by early writings of Marx. Though 
it  was understood somewhat differently by  different members of  the Institute, this 
critical attitude towards theory reflects a  relentlessly self-reflexive posture of  reason 
criticizing itself. 
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of Horkheimer and later Adorno, pursued an  impressive array of  in-
terdisciplinary studies and social research, developing innovative and 
original studies of  the culture industry, political economy, and social 
psychology. They also articulated an enduring philosophical orientation 
in “critical theory,” which seeks to uncover the abridgements and pa-
thologies of modern reason and to work toward the ongoing liberation 
from oppressive ideological forces and social structures.11
Further, drawing upon a unique blend of Hegelian Marxist philoso-
phy and Jewish messianic thought, thinkers associated with this early 
Frankfurt School marshaled a trenchant critique of capitalism and the 
amalgamation of  technology, the market, and mass culture that pre-
vails in liberal democratic societies. Most fundamentally, they offered 
a  thoroughgoing criticism of  logical positivism and the idolization 
of  scientific and technological progress, which ushers in a commodi-
fication of  social life and reinforces the instrumentalized rationality 
of the modern age, “the period of docile masses governed by clocks.”12 
Such false forms of consciousness not only prove de-humanizing but 
also signal a lingering susceptibility to violent and totalizing political 
regimes, in the “mysterious willingness of the technologically educated 
masses to fall under the spell of any despotism” and the “self-destructive 
affinity to nationalistic paranoia.”13 Informed by the social alienation 
many members experienced as Jews in the interwar period, this critical 
stance gained particular urgency with the rise of National Socialism 
in 1933, which drove its major figures into exile.14
11 For a  description of  the widespread influence of  this Critical Theory, see 
B. H. McLean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics, New York 2012, 
p.  199–208. This critical approach also informs the move from concern with meta-
physics to studies focused on future emancipation from unjust and alienating social 
structures. In the words of Ernst Bloch: “The forward-look has replaced the upward-
look.” See E. Bloch, Hunger, “Something in a Dream,” “God of Hope”, Thing-For-Us, in: 
E. Mendieta (ed.), The Frankfurt School on Religion, p. 50. 
12 M.  Horkheimer, Theism and Atheism, in: E.  Mendieta (ed.), The Frankfurt 
School on Religion, p. 222. 
13 M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Frag-
ments, ed. G. Schmid Noerr, trans. E. Jephcott, Standford 2002 [1987], xvi.
14 The Institute was first temporarily transferred to Geneva and then to Colum-
bia University in New York. In 1941, Horkheimer moved to the Pacific Palisades, near 
Los Angeles, where he  lived in  close proximity to  other exiled German intellectu-
als such as  Bertold Brecht and Thomas Mann. Adorno followed shortly thereafter. 
Walter Benjamin, however, refusing to  leave Europe, committed suicide at a border 
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Within this broad field of inquiry, the critique of religion emerged as 
a recurrent and animating theme. Though proceeding with a methodo- 
logical skepticism and maintaining a critical distance toward religious 
dogmas and institutions,15 thinkers of  the early Frankfurt School op-
posed the simplistic secular narrative of  Enlightenment reason over-
coming religion and recognized the enduring potential of  religion 
to  motivate resistance and transformative action in  the face of  op-
pressive political systems. Religious traditions present promise and 
yearning, providing common language for addressing hopes and 
discontents and preserving forms of  recollection that are neither ex-
hausted by nor reducible to other aspects of modern culture. Religion 
thus has the capacity to  form a  powerful engine of  social critique, 
able to  unmask reigning structures of  domination, delusion, and op-
pression. It  provides a  renewable and inexhaustible “lexicon of  tran-
scendence” that gives expression to  vital human longing, although 
this yearning itself continually needs to  be rescued from its reifica-
tion and deformation in doctrines and institutions through ongoing 
criticism.16
In this fashion, the first generation of  the Frankfurt School ex-
pressed a sharp critique of religion as expressed in belief systems and 
political institutions, and especially as  a  product of  modern culture, 
while also maintaining an awareness of the power of religion to fund 
and animate transformative social action. Such a  critique thus seeks 
not to  overcome religious faith as  outmoded superstition but to  re-
cover it  as a  vibrant source of  social criticism. In  the longing for re-
demption and openness to  transcendence, religion proves a  resilient 
and destabilizing force against destructive claims to  totality. In  this 
crossing between France and Spain. For a detailed description of this period of exile, 
see R. Wiggerhaus, Flight, The Frankfurt School, p. 127–148.
15 See T.  Adorno, Reason and Revelation, in: E.  Mendieta (ed.), The Frankfurt 
School on Religion, p. 173: “[…] I see no other possibility than an extreme ascesis toward 
any type of revealed faith, an extreme loyalty to the prohibition of images, far beyond 
what this once originally meant.”
16 E.  Mendieta, Introduction: Religion as  Critique, in: E.  Mendieta (ed.), The 
Frankfurt School on Religion, p. 9. Such ongoing criticism is the object of Adorno’s nega-
tive, “inverse theology,” a distinctive brand of philosophically-informed apophaticism. 
On this negative dimension of critical reason in Adorno’s thought, see C. C. Brittain, 
Adorno and Theology, New York 2010, p. 83–113; and P. E. Gordon, Adorno and Existence, 
Cambridge 2016, p. 120–157.
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vein, for instance, Ernst Bloch speaks of “the radical, subversive dream 
of the Bible” and the continuing significance of discourse about God, 
which serves to  indicate the problem of  the radically new and abso-
lutely redemptive, that which is not just hidden but also not yet – still 
coming to be.17 In similar fashion, Horkheimer points to “an entirely 
Other” and “the thought of something other than the world,” which 
can arrest the glorification of scientific and technological progress and 
through which the injustices and wounds of history might be given 
their voice. “Without God one will try in  vain to  preserve absolute 
meaning.”18 Yet at the same time, as Adorno insists, “…God, the Ab-
solute, eludes finite beings.”19 Such yearned-for religious truth, then, 
can never be adequately captured in thought or reliably served by so-
cial institutions but must be  ever subject to  negation and ongoing 
criticism.20
In this sense, a productive tension exists between religious faith and 
secular reason, and the relation between them resists any final reso-
lution. Instead, in the face of the pathological distortions of modern 
society, religion provides a  reservoir of humanity’s recollection of  in-
justice and longing for reconciliation. Religious practices and forms 
of thought retain the crucial awareness that “something is missing.”21
17 E. Bloch, Hunger, “Something in a Dream,” “God of Hope,” Thing-For-Us, p. 50; 
and E. Mendieta, Introduction: Religion as Critique, p. 16, n. 24. 
18 M. Horkheimer, Theism and Atheism, p. 220–223, at 221, 223.
19 T. Adorno, Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg’s Moses and Aron, in: Quasi Una Fan-
tasia, trans. R. Livingston, London 1992, p. 226. Quoted in E. Mendieta, Introduction: 
Religion as Critique, p. 10.
20 The work of Bloch captures this tension. He writes: “Where there is hope there 
is religion, but where there is religion there is not always hope…” (E. Bloch, Hunger, 
“Something in a Dream,” “God of Hope,” Things-For-Us, p. 50); and again, “Only an atheist 
can be a good Christian; only a Christian can be a good atheist” (E. Bloch, Atheism 
in Christianity: The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom, trans. J. T. Swann, New York 
1972, p. 9).
21 The description of religion as an “awareness of what is missing,” which Haber-
mas chose as a title for a later 2008 essay, alludes to this treatment of religion in the 
work of  Bloch and Adorno. See M.  Reder, J.  Schmidt, Habermas and Religion, in: 
J. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular 
Age, trans. C. Cronin, Malden 2012, p. 11, n. 5.
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Early Habermas on Religion and Reason
Habermas own work carries on  many of  the features of  the early 
Frankfurt School’s critique of religion.22 In 1956, following the return 
of Adorno and Horkheimer from their exile in United States, he be-
came Adorno’s assistant at the newly reopened Institute for Social Re-
search at the University of Frankfurt. He would later become a profes-
sor of philosophy and sociology at Frankfurt in 1964 and director of the 
Max Planck Institute in  Starnberg in  1971. These appointments pro-
vided him a platform to develop a modified version of the Institute’s 
interdisciplinary research program, developing a  distinctive research 
trajectory that differed from critical approaches of both Horkheimer 
and Adorno.23
As with the figures of the first-generation Frankfurt School, Haber-
mas’s own early writings do not reject religion outright but recognize 
its enduring importance for meaningful social criticism. Yet these ini-
tial studies, which focused on a critique of positivism and the de-his-
toricized philosophy of consciousness,24 also struck a more confident 
tone concerning the ability of human reason to engage and salvage the 
insights of religion. In the sporadic and indirect treatments of religion 
during the first decades of his work, Habermas maintained that while 
religious insights are not to be dispensed with by philosophy, they find 
continuing validity only through their transference into rational and 
secular discourse. Accordingly, religious traditions, ideas, symbols must 
be interpreted and justified, their sacred meanings opened up to ratio-
nal and discursive treatment. Thus, for example, values from the Judeo- 
-Christian tradition such as the dignity of persons, freedom, liberation 
from oppression, and communal solidarity are transposed into a field 
of discourse which finds its justification not in standards of faith but 
22 On  the question of  continuity or  discontinuity between Habermas and the 
early Frankfurt School, see E.  Mendieta, Appendix: Religion in  Habermas’s Work, 
p. 392–395; and F. Dallmayr’s review of J. Habermas, Religion and Rationality: Essays 
on Reason, God, and Modernity (MIT Press, 2012), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 
5.02.2003, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23259-religion-and-rationality-essays-on-reason-
god-and-modernity/. 
23 See M. Junker-Kenny, Habermas and Theology, p. 1–2. Habermas’s research into 
social action and language theory helped to define the research objectives of the ‘sec-
ond generation’ of scholars at the Institute.
24 See E. Mendieta, Appendix: Religion in Habermas’s Work, p. 392–395.
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in persuasive arguments and publicly accessible claims of reason based 
on valid factual knowledge. Through such rational analysis and intel-
lectual exchange, these meanings become open and explicit as binding 
and consensual moral norms. Moreover, Habermas makes clear that 
this labor of translation applies not only to broader moral attitudes and 
values but extends even to explicitly religious concepts. His 1973 work 
Legitimation Crisis asserts, “The idea of  God is  transformed (aufge-
hoben) into a concept of a Logos that determines the community of be-
lievers and the real life-context of a self-emancipating society.”25 And 
again, in a 1974 lecture, he claims: “God indicates only approximately 
a structure of communication,” which forces one to look beyond merely 
contingent existence.26
Used in this manner, the term “God” is far removed from any cultic 
practices and no longer indicates a personal being nor functions as the 
object of private or communal devotion. It serves instead to name that 
which gives coherence, unity, and depth of meaning to communal hu-
man interaction and to the potential for human progress. Consequently, 
in  Habermas’s early works, the very idea of  God, as  with other reli-
giously elaborated symbols and meanings, admits of some translation 
into a regulative concept that indicates broader norms for social inter-
action. This emphasis on the transposition of religious meaning, or the 
“linguistification of  the sacred” (die Versprachlichung des Sakralen),27 
would find its clearest expression in Habermas’s subsequent treatments 
of communicative action and discourse theory.
Religion and Communicative Action
Habermas’s ground-breaking 1981 work The Theory of  Communicative 
Action outlines an  innovative analysis of  rationality and human agen-
cy as grounded in dialogue and social interaction. The study presents 
25 J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, Boston 1975, p. 121. 
26 J.  Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt 
am Main 1974, p. 101. 
27 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 77. This “linguistifi-
cation of the sacred,” which centers on the logic of secularization, follows Habermas’s 
broader project of the “linguistification of social theory” in the 1970s, which culminated 
in his Theory of Communicative Action. See E. Mendieta, Appendix: Religion in Haber-
mas’s Work, p. 395–397. 
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a notable transition away from a focus on philosophical anthropology 
and hermeneutics towards intersubjectivity, structures of social action, 
and language theory, and it establishes the theory of communicative 
rationality for which Habermas is best known.28 The lines of  inquiry 
established in this seminal work also set the stage for later modifica-
tions to his early treatment of religion.
Habermas locates a point of departure for this new approach to ra-
tionality in human intersubjectivity and the cooperative relationships 
of dialogue and exchange that constitute human communities. Devel-
oping an adequately critical theory of social action, he argues, demands 
a paradigm shift from the transcendental framework of the philosophy 
of consciousness to the philosophy of language.29 Whereas philosophi-
cal explorations of consciousness often begin with the solitary autono-
mous individual set over against the outside world  – and the resul-
tant dualism between subject and object – the turn to language theory 
recognizes the conscious self as already constituted by shared cultural 
references and communal interactions, and situated within an  on-
going process of  social learning. Thus, human rationality is  inescap-
ably communicative. It is rooted in dialogue and oriented toward the 
shared search for understanding. Likewise, meaningful social action 
is “communicative action.” It proceeds through discourse in the public 
realm, in which persons strive to reach mutual understanding and base 
their behaviors on binding consensual norms. Such ongoing discourse 
shapes the “lifeworld” of communities – the common assumptions and 
“background knowledge” enshrined in  cultural meanings, self-under-
standings, and social values, and it forms the locus for both social prog-
ress and social critique.30 Philosophical reasoning is thus displaced from 
28 For a  helpful comparative treatment of  Habermas’s understanding of  com-
municative rationality, set in  contrast with the work of  Hans-Georg Gadamer and 
Paul Ricoeur, see B. H. McLean, Biblical Interpretation and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 
p. 210–226.
29 See J.  Habermas, The Theory of  Communicative Action, vol. 1:  Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, trans. T. McCarthy, Boston 1981, especially chapters 1 and 3.
30 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 13, and p. 335–337; 
and vol. 2, p. 119–153. The language of  “lifeworld” is adopted from Edmund Husserl, 
who uses it to distinguish the natural and pre-theoretical orientation of ordinary or   
everyday living from the theoretical and objectifying perspective of the natural sciences. 
For Habermas, the lifeworld indicates the intersubjectively shared horizon of  back-
ground knowledge, constituted by common life-relations and spheres of sociality such 
Kevin M. Vander Schel46
the “I” of the transcendental subject to the plural “we” that functions 
as the subject of an unending conversation.
With regard to  method, this shift to  language theory offers dis-
tinct pragmatic advantages. Where the philosophy of  consciousness 
often tends toward solipsistic introspection, the philosophy of  lan-
guage is  oriented to  public exchange, rational cooperation, and mu-
tual understanding. Accordingly, this paradigm shift entails a further 
move from metaphysical to “postmetaphysical” thinking.31 Rather than 
holding to timeless principles or invariant structures of thought, reason 
advances modestly and incrementally as  theoretical and practical va-
lidity claims – each embedded in a particular historical and linguistic 
context – are further tested and modified through dialogue and argu-
ment. This discursive orientation also provides the basis for Habermas’s 
conception of discourse ethics, developed in his 1983 work Moral Con-
sciousness and Communicative Action, which anchors moral norms in the 
practice of dialogue and search for consensus between free and equal 
participants.32
Within these works, Habermas’s early position on the translatability 
of religious meaning is expanded. In his Theory of Communicative Action, 
religion is treated broadly and in functionalist terms. Drawing especial-
ly from Emile Durkheim’s analysis of sacred symbols and norms estab-
lished and regenerated in communal ritual practice, Habermas suggests 
that communicative action effects a  disenchantment of  the domain 
of the sacred by releasing the normative and rational potential of reli-
gious practices into the publically accessible language.33 In its relation 
to  such communicative rationality, the significance of  religion is  ef-
fectively provisional, as the lure of the sacred, “the spellbinding power 
as  household and culture, which are prior to  institutions or  structures of  an action 
“system” that organizes patterns of strategic or instrumental action. 
31 On this turn to postmetaphysical thinking, see J. Habermas, Postmetaphysical 
Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. W. M. Hohengarten, Cambridge, MA 1996, espe-
cially chapter 3, Themes in Postmetaphysical Thinking, p. 28–56.
32 See J.  Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. 
Ch. Lenhardt, Cambridge 2001. For an overview of Habermas’s discourse ethics, see 
W. Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas, Los Angeles 
1997.
33 See J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, V.3: The Rational 
Structure of the Linguistification of the Sacred, p. 77–112. See also N. Adams, Habermas 
and Theology, p. 66–91. 
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of the holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of criticizable 
validity claims.”34 Here again, Habermas recognizes religion as a cata-
lyst for social development, as it drives communities toward solidarity 
and instills universal moral norms. Nonetheless, he argues, the archaic 
forms of religious solidarity must give way to generally available forms 
of  rationality: “the socially integrative and expressive functions that 
were at first fulfilled by religious practice pass over to communicative 
action; the authority of  the holy is gradually replaced by  the author-
ity of an achieved consensus.”35 Within this theory of communicative 
action, then, religion occupies a  transitional role, as a developmental 
phase in the growth of modern, democratic societies.36 Indeed, in his 
short work The New Conservatism (Die neue Unübersichlichkeit), pub-
lished several years before in 1985, he suggests the possibility that “after 
the religious world views have collapsed” nothing of explicitly religious 
truth claims will remain other than the “secular principles of universal-
ist ethics of responsibility.”37
Yet scattered remarks in  this period also offer more cautious and 
positive appraisals of  the ongoing significance of  religious meaning, 
pointing to  religious traditions as  vital resources for human living, 
whose hidden potential must be sought out and understood.38 “Among 
the modern societies,” Habermas writes in a tribute to his friend Ger-
shom Scholem, “only those that are able to introduce into the secular 
domain the essential contents of their religious traditions which point 
beyond the merely human realm will also be  able to  rescue the sub-
stance of the human.”39
Habermas would further develop this insight in  subsequent writ-
ings. In the course of his ongoing work on morality and political theory 
from the late 1980s through the 1990s, he  began to  modify his po-
sition on  the relation of  religion and communicative rationality and 
34 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 77. Emphasis in orig-
inal.
35 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 77.
36 M. Reder, J. Schmidt, Habermas and Religion, p. 5.
37 J. Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, in: Don 
S. Browning, F. Schüssler Fiorenza (eds.), Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology, 
New York 1992, p. 237. 
38 M. Reder, J. Schmidt, Habermas and Religion, p. 5.
39 J.  Habermas, Politik, Kunst, Religion: Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen, 
Stuttgart 1978, p.142.
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to  attend more carefully to  the unique contributions of  religious in-
sight. On  one hand, he  continued to  maintain that communicative 
rationality and postmetaphysical thinking have no  need for a  tran-
scendent God as a guarantor of meaning or normative moral claims. 
To the contrary, he maintained, transcendence is built into linguistic 
exchange of communicative reason. In this respect, “postmetaphysical 
thought differs from religion in  that it  recovers the meaning of  the 
unconditional without recourse to God or an Absolute.”40 Moreover, 
within this postmetaphysical context, religious truth claims still must 
undergo a  process of  “translation,” as  the meaning of  religious prac-
tices, experiences, and beliefs has to be coded in  the language of  an 
expert culture, and organized according to standards outside the self-
understanding of these communities.41 On the other hand, Habermas 
also acknowledges in this period that religious practices retain mean-
ings and values that cannot be usurped or replaced by philosophy, and 
which offer an important source both of untrammeled hope and solace: 
“philosophy cannot provide a  substitute for the consolation whereby 
religion invests unavoidable suffering and unrecompensed injustice, 
the contingencies of  need, loneliness, sickness, and death, with new 
significance and teaches us to bear them.”42 Further, he notes, religious 
traditions preserve powerful forms of  recollection and give witness 
40 J. Habermas, To Seek to Salvage Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile 
Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer, in: J. Habermas, Religion and 
Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, Cambridge 2002, p. 108.
41 See J. Habermas, A Reply, in: J. Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Miss-
ing, p. 79. See also J. Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, 
p. 227. In part, Habermas notes, this project reflects the legacy of Hegelian thought, 
as the “sublation of the world of religious representation in the philosophical concept” 
also entails “the saving of its essential contents only by casting off the substance of its 
piety” (p. 227). Yet the demands of postmetaphysical thinking also lead on to different 
paths, with the focus falling on  language and communication, not just or primarily 
concerning specific religious ideas but also meaning as embedded in ritual exchanges 
and communal interactions. Here, in language reminiscent of Kant’s “kingdom of ends,” 
the transcendence that is from within and in the world is that which points beyond 
limitations of respective historical and cultural standpoints to anticipate an “unlimited 
community of communication” (p. 237), “universal covenant of fellowship,” or “solidar-
ity among human beings who acknowledge one another unconditionally” (p. 238).
42 J. Habermas, To Seek to Salvage Unconditional Meaning without God is a Futile 
Undertaking: Reflections on a Remark of Max Horkheimer, p. 108.
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to understandings of transcendence that strive to realize “this worldly 
goals of human dignity and social emancipation.”43
In this regard, in  the wake of his work on communicative action, 
Habermas’s writings display a growing recognition that religious faith 
possesses a distinctive competency that is not matched or supplanted 
by  other forms of  philosophical or  rational inquiry, and which can-
not simply be  translated into public reason without remainder. The 
inspiring contents and insights belonging to religion, insofar as  they 
elude comparable expression in philosophical or generalized rational 
discourse, can neither be replaced nor repressed.44 Therefore, “as long 
as no better words for what religion can say are found in the medium 
of rational discourse,” communicative reason should “coexist abstemi-
ously” with religion, “neither supporting it nor combatting it.”45
Religious Faith and Public Discourse
Habermas’s more recent writings have deepened and advanced this 
constructive engagement with religion. Since the turn of the century, 
he has produced a growing series of lectures and essays on the contin-
ued importance of religion in the public sphere – a subject, he notes, 
that takes on special urgency in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
of  9/11 and amidst the ongoing threat of  global terrorism.46 These 
studies include considerations of human nature in  light of  advances 
in genetic engineering and biotechnology (The Future of Human Na-
ture, 2003), inquiries into the growing clash of  religions and the rise 
of fundamentalist forms of thought (Between Naturalism and Religion, 
2008), his prominent public debates with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, 
43 J. Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, p. 227. 
44 See J. Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, p. 237; 
repeated from Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 60: 
“As long as  religious language bears within itself inspiring, indeed, unrelinquishable 
semantic contents which elude (for the moment?) the expressive power of  a  philo-
sophical language and still await translation into a discourse that gives reasons for its 
positions, philosophy, even in its postmetaphysical form, will neither be able to replace 
nor to repress religion.”
45 J. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, p. 145.
46 J. Habermas, Faith and Knowledge, in: J. Habermas, The Future of Human Na-
ture, trans. H. Beister, W. Rehg, Malden 2003, p. 101. 
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later to become pope Benedict XVI (Dialectics of Secularization, 2006), 
and several published responses to critical dialogues of his work on re-
ligion.47
These later writings offer an important corrective to Habermas’s ear-
lier approach by disconnecting his theory of communicative action from 
the secularization thesis that insisted on the inevitable demise of reli-
gion.48 Together with his call to postmetaphysical thought, Habermas’s 
ongoing work on religion and reason highlights the increasing impor-
tance of shifting to a “postsecular” understanding of society, a recogni-
tion that religious voices have not fallen away but continue to  play 
a vital role in western societies and on the global political stage. Not 
only do “religious communities continue to exist in a context of ongo-
ing secularization,” but they also stand to offer an important contribu-
tion to contemporary democratic discourse.49 Such religious traditions, 
he suggests, are not merely to be tolerated as lingering remnants of ar-
chaic or irrational forms of thought; rather, properly critical religious 
interpretations of self and world have an “equal claim to recognition” 
in  the public discourse of  democratic societies.50 While maintaining 
the priority of postmetaphysical thinking, Habermas thus points to the 
need to avoid the threat of fundamentalist thinking on both sides: the 
rigidity of a religious orthodoxy that permits no challenges from secu-
lar reason and the equally intolerant forms of scientistic fundamental-
ism that insist upon a naturalistic worldview and dogmatically reject all 
religious claims to validity.51
Within this postsecular context, Habermas still calls for a process 
of translation between religious faith and reason. Viewed apart from 
their original faith context, religious beliefs and practices can only com-
mand general public assent on the basis of criticizable validity claims. 
Significantly, however, Habermas casts this project no longer as a one-
sided effort but as a mutually reciprocal and cooperative task of learning 
47 See J. Habermas, The Future of Human Nature; J. Habermas, Between Natural-
ism and Religion, trans. C.  Cronin, Malden 2008; J.  Habermas, Dialectics of  Secular-
ization; Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing; and C. Calhoun, E. Mendieta, 
J. VanAntwerpen (eds.), Habermas and Religion.
48 M.  Junker-Kenny, Religion and Public Reason: A  Comparison of  the Positions 
of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Paul Ricoeur, Berlin 2014, p. 151.
49 J. Habermas, Faith and Knowledge, p. 104.
50 J. Habermas, Reply to My Critics, p. 348.
51 J. Habermas, Faith and Knowledge, p. 114–117.
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and conversation. Religions, he acknowledges, have a still-unexhausted 
potential that provides important and provocative contemporary re-
sources of meaning. They are not reducible to general ethical perspec-
tives or to insights into the fullness or flourishing of an individual life. 
Instead, in  the face of pressing global challenges, religious traditions 
possess distinctive strengths that have not been matched by other voic-
es in the public sphere. They have the capacity to engender forms of so-
cial solidarity that can confront the de-humanizing power structures 
of market-driven globalization, to give voice to the vulnerability and 
powerlessness of the oppressed poor, and – amidst the growing com-
modification of human life in contemporary popular culture – to  in-
sist upon the ineradicable dignity of human beings and their freedom 
for self-determination.52 In this sense, “religious traditions perform the 
function of articulating an awareness of what is lacking or absent. They 
keep alive a  sensitivity to  failure and suffering.”53 This “an awareness 
of what is missing, of what cries out to heaven,” offers a crucially stub-
born source of resistance to the self-destructive tendencies of rational-
ization and the social pathologies of modernity.54
Nevertheless, this religious potential for regeneration and resistance 
must be mediated through language and developed and tested in de-
liberate discourse. As Habermas notes, “it makes a difference whether 
we speak with one another or merely about one another.”55 In pluralistic 
and democratic societies, secular and religious citizens alike participate 
in the public sphere through reasoned critique and dialogue. Yet while 
both are called to join the interdisciplinary venture of reimagining and 
rearticulating the core convictions at the heart of political society, the 
foundation for this cooperative discourse remains the generally acces-
sible reasons of public validity claims, an  arena in which the appeal 
to personal religious experience remains inadmissible.
Consequently, for Habermas, properly critical reason must retain 
an ambivalent attitude toward religious faith, with a stance that is at 
once receptive and cautious. While religious faith may be open to and 
may nourish the pursuit of  understanding, as  indicated by  the well-
worn catchword fides quaerens intellectum, it nonetheless also remains 
52 J. Habermas, Faith and Knowledge, p. 114–115.
53 J. Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, p. 6.
54 J. Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p. 19.
55 J. Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p. 16.
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at root opaque to public and generalizable forms of rationality. It pos-
sesses a core that is not open to translation. The insights of religious 
faith, then, cannot be  fully tranferred into public discourse. Rather, 
religious and non-religious perspectives present complementary intel-
lectual formations and learning processes: “postmetaphysical thinking 
can relate to  religion in  a  way that is  at the same time agnostic and 
ready to  learn. Faith retains something opaque for knowledge which 
can neither be denied nor just ignored. Secular reason insists on the 
difference between certainties of faith and publicly criticizable validity 
claims, yet abstains from a  theory which judges the rationality or  ir-
rationality of religion as a whole.”56
In this respect, Habermas maintains that religious faith holds con-
tinued promise for contemporary political society, offering meaningful 
contributions that cannot be dissolved or fully transferred into secular 
forms of reason. Yet believers and religious thinkers remains obligated 
to enter into the conversation with the broader intellectual community, 
and to explicate and set forth these positions in the publicly accessible 
language of rational discourse. The boundaries between “secular” and 
“religious” reasons are therefore fluid. And thus “[d]etermining these 
disputed boundaries should …  be seen as  a  cooperative task which 
requires both sides to take on the perspective of the other one.”57
Conclusion: The View From Afar
As this brief overview indicates, Habermas’s critique of  religion, and 
his treatment of  the relationship between reason and religious faith, 
displays a  gradual but notable developmental progression. Though 
his early works portrayed communicative reason and postmetaphysi-
cal thinking as  superceding the role of  faith, he  subsequently began 
to emphasize their lasting complementarity, and his more recent writ-
ings outline a further basis for a cooperative and constructive dialogue 
between religious faith and secular reason. This development both sig-
nals important features of Habermas’s own mature thought on religion 
56 See J. Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p. 18: “Faith remains opaque 
for knowledge in a way which may neither be denied nor simply accepted.” 
57 J. Habermas, Faith and Knowledge, p. 109 (emphasis in original).
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and highlights several notable implications for ongoing conversations 
of religious faith in contemporary public discourse.
Habermas’s progressing critical engagement with religion first of all 
highlights the distinctive dialogical posture of his thought. Through-
out his career, Habermas has exhibited a  salutary willingness to  en-
gage in sincere dialogue with religious thinkers and sympathetic schol-
ars of religion, even while consistently maintaining his own position 
of “methodological atheism.”58 Not only as a matter of theory, but also 
performatively, his works underscore the importance of ongoing dia-
logue with religion and an openness to allowing one’s positions be test-
ed and refined through discussion: “Once we open ourselves to a dia-
logue we become caught up in its embrace.”59 This recognition of the 
ongoing need for dialogue highlights an important aspect of the self-
limitations of critical reason, and Habermas has repeatedly displayed 
a readiness to modify and amend his treatments, to correct over-hasty 
assumptions, entertain new ideas, or clarify or expand older positions.60
Beyond this emphasis on  the continuing importance of  dialogue, 
however, Habermas’s later treatments of religion also suggest something 
of a return to the insightful critiques of religion outlined by the early 
Frankfurt School. He  acknowledges an  enduring prophetic potential 
of religious traditions in their capacity for disruptive forms of recollec-
tion and remembrance that resist the forgetting concealed in modern 
rationalization and historicization of the past. Such remembering brings 
to heightened awareness the irrepressible demands for justice and soli-
darity that are absent in contemporary societies. As he notes in an essay 
reflecting on the contributions of the Catholic theologian Johann Bap-
tist Metz, “remembrance preserves from decay things we regard as indis-
pensable and which are in extreme danger.”61 These acts of recollection 
carry potential to drive dialectical reflection on the abridgements of rea-
son and the decay that follows modern progress, but they also cultivate 
a  sensitivity to  the need for liberation from situations of  misery and 
oppression, gesturing to “a community, which would entwine freedom 
58 See J.  Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in  this World, 
p. 226–227; and J. Habermas, Reply to My Critics, p. 352–357.
59 J. Habermas, A Reply, p. 72.
60 J. Habermas, Reply to My Critics, p. 347.
61 J. Habermas, Israel or Athens? Where does Anamnestic Reason Belong? Johannes 
Baptist Metz on Unity amidst Multicultural Plurality, in: J. Habermas, Religion and Ra-
tionality, p. 132.
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and solidarity within the horizon of an undamaged intersubjectivity.”62 
Even apart from the otherworldly promise of  salvation, then, these 
cultures of remembrance can keep open a restless and passionate ques-
tioning toward the justice and solidarity which are lacking in “a world 
flattened out by  empiricism, and rendered normatively mute.”63
Further, Habermas recognizes the potential of religious traditions 
to meet a peculiar and recurring “political deficiency” existing in mod-
ern democratic societies, which stems from the individualistic orienta-
tion of contemporary forms of ethical thinking.64 Amidst the emerging 
challenges of multicultural and global society, increased opportunities 
for national and international conflict, and the systematic and struc-
tural injustices that trail modern economic and technological growth, 
he notes, the public institutions and routine modes of social coopera-
tion established in democratic societies have often proven themselves 
unable to offer an adequate collective response. Indeed, the enormity 
of such difficulties requires a thoroughgoing “shift” in “the parameters 
of  the range of  values” in  political and social discussion, away from 
merely individual duties and responsibilities and toward solidarity and 
collective action that strives for liberating justice.65 Faced with this 
challenge, practicing religious communities may thus offer some hope 
of motivating those crucial forms of shared action and enduring social 
movements which are especially required in  times of social crisis yet 
conspicuously absent in  contemporary western democratic societies, 
calling forth inspiring social countercurrents that are rooted in social 
solidarity and the promise of redemptive justice.66
Significantly, however, Habermas notes that this capacity of  reli-
gious faith to offer prophetic and poignant social criticism and to mo-
bilize collective resistance to social pathologies turns in an important 
respect on  its untranslatable character. Precisely because religious 
62 J. Habermas, Israel or Athens?, p. 132.
63 J. Habermas, Israel or Athens?, p. 134.
64 J. Habermas, Reply to My Critics, p. 356.
65 J. Habermas, Reply to My Critics, p. 354.
66 Habermas finds the clear potential for such collective action in religious tradi-
tions: “Interestingly, the practice of religious communities bridges this fault line of the 
individual facilitation of solidarity in advance through the shared faith in the promise 
of a ‘redemptive’ or ‘liberating’ justice” ( J. Habermas, Reply to My Critics, p. 356). He goes 
on, however, to suggest that the question whether this potential for collective action 
can be realized in fact is not yet settled (p. 357).
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traditions remain aloof from the broader lines of  public discourse 
and the generally accessible forms of public rationality, they may pos-
sess a corrective capacity to speak against social pathologies that prey 
on the powerless, to interrupt de-humanizing processes of rationaliza-
tion and industrialization, and to reorient societies toward cooperative 
practices of solidarity.67 Religious faith, then, draws its distinct poten-
tial to  inform social critique from its distinct foundation. Habermas 
writes, “ ‘Religion’ owes its legitimizing force to the fact that it draws 
its power to convince from its own roots. It  is rooted, independently 
of politics, in notions of salvation and calamity (Heil und Unheil) and 
in corresponding practices of  coping with redemptive and menacing 
forces.”68 Thus, while religious contents such as human freedom, the 
dignity of life, and social emancipation may admit of some transference 
into a non-religious intellectual framework, central conceptions such 
as  transcendent hope that prevails amidst despair, the promise of  re-
demption and resurrection in the face of death, and indeed the concept 
of God itself resist any such translation out of their original horizon.69 
Religious traditions carry a distinctive potential for prophetic critique 
insofar as they retain the perspective of “the view from afar.”70
Notably, this incommensurability between specifically religious and 
publicly accessible rational insights holds important implications for ex-
plicitly theological discourse as well. Habermas suggests that those theo-
logical approaches that seek to open themselves too eagerly to discourses 
in the human sciences and to social scientific approaches, and so aban-
don all substantive reference to foundational religious experiences and 
truth claims, risk losing their identity: “I hold that a conversation cannot 
succeed between a theology and a philosophy which use the language 
of religious authorship and which meet on the bridge of religious expe-
riences that have become literary expressions.”71 Properly religious and 
theological discourse instead proceeds in  living communities of  faith, 
and is anchored in distinctive communal practices of ritual and worship. 
67 See M. Junker-Kenny, Religion and Public Reason, p. 169.
68 J. Habermas, “The Political”: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance 
of Political Theology, in: E. Mendieta, J. VanAntwerpen (eds.), The Power of Religion 
in the Public Sphere, New York 2011, 17. See also M. Junker-Kenny, Religion and Public 
Reason, p. 164.
69 M. Junker-Kenny, Religion and Public Reason, p. 181–182.
70 J. Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing, p. 16.
71 J. Habermas, Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in this World, p. 233.
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Those religious and theological perspectives that too greatly distance 
themselves from their originating institutions and practices run the dan-
ger of falling into merely trivializing moral trends toward self-fulfillment 
and generic conceptions of personal flourishing and could “forfeit pre-
cisely the solidarity-founding element of  a  communal practice of  reli-
gious worship” that distinguishes religious traditions from other social 
movements and cultural communities. Therefore, Habermas argues, any 
“religion that had lost the capacity to organize the encounter with the 
sacred in ritual forms and survived only in the fleeting shape of religios-
ity would be indistinguishable from other ethical forms of life.”72 
Through this evolving critical treatment of religion, Habermas thus 
presents a distinctive and important voice in contemporary discussions 
of the place of religious and theological discourse in the public sphere. 
His position enables both a constructive critique of religious belief and 
a sober appreciation of the potential of religious communities to prof-
fer poignant social criticism. Moving beyond the reductive narrative 
of a progressive secularization of religious values and concepts, his writ-
ings point to the promise of increasingly careful reflection on religious 
traditions and the need for more productive and nuanced frameworks 
of dialogue surrounding conceptions of religion and secularity. Indeed, 
for Habermas, the present challenges stemming from the faltering 
of global economic systems and political alliances, the rise of national-
istic anger, and the spectre of sectarian violence only serve to heighten 
the importance of this ongoing conversation, providing a vital avenue 
of cooperative social criticism that attends to the recurring gaps in the 
social fabric of contemporary political communities.
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